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1. SUMMARY: Petr urges the Court to decide whether the rule of 
Thompson v. City of Louisiana, 362 u.s. 199 (1960), that a federal court 
in a habeas proceeding must deny the writ if, in the state trial, there 
was "some" evidence to prove each element of the offense, is too narrm11 
in light of the court's decision in In re WinshiE, 397 u.s. 358 (1970). 
he was 
2. FACTS: Petr and Mrs. Cole, whom petr had met while/in prison, 
went for a drive one afternoon. Both petr and Cole had been drinking and 
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were "pretty well loaded." Petr had a revolver with him, and there was 
a butcher knife belonging to Cole in the front seat of the car: all the 
accounterments for a quiet Sunday drive. While at a diner, petr became 
boisterous. A sheriff noticed the gun and asked that petr give him the 
gun until petr sobered up. Cole insisted that they were going "straight 
home," and the sheriff allowed them to leave without confiscating the 
gun. From this point on, the facts are based on a statement given to 
the police by petr after his arrest. While driving home, Cole said she 
wished to have sex with petr. He refused, whereupon Cole attempted to 
stab him with her knife and stated that if she couldn't have him no other 
woman could. Jackson pushed her away and hit her with the butt of his 
revolver. He then left the car and crossed the street to call a taxi. 
While awaiting the cab , Cole drove up and persuaded petr to reenter the 
car. They then drove to a secluded church and began "messing around" 
and drinking. At this point cole, who was naked from the waist down, 
and petr were outside the car. According to petr, Cole again sought 
sexual relations with petr and upon petr's refusal, she again attempted 
to attack him with the knife. To warn her away, petr said that he fired 
the revolver into the ground six times, which emptied it. He then broke 
the revolver open, emptied the six shell casings, which police officers 
later found, and reloaded. He stated that when the gun was reloaded, 
Cole attempted to wrest the pistol from him and that during the scuffle, 
the revolver accidentally discharged, killing Cole. Cole was shot 
twice; one bullet passed through her left breast and the fatal bullet 
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passed through the left side of her ches,t. Petr fled the scene but 
was picked up later in Florida, at which time he made the statement to 
police. 
Petr was convicted of first degree murder in a trial before the 
court {Gates) and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. He appealed to 
y 
the Virginia Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction. Thereafter, 
petr sought habeas in the E.D. va. and the DC (Warriner) granted the 
writ. Apparently, (the DC's opinion is not attached to the petn), the 
DC found that there was insufficient evidence in the record to prove 
premeditation, an element of the offense of Ml. The CA 4 reversed. The 
court stated that under the rule of Thompson v. City of Louisiana, supra, 
a federal court must deny the writ if there was "some" evidence to prove 
each element of the offense. It rejected petr's argument that after 
In re Winship, supra, a habeas court can deny the writ only if there was 
evidence to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
After reviewing the evidence,the court found that there was "some" evi-
dence of premeditation. It noted that under Virginia law, the requiremen-~ 
of premeditation is met if the necessary intention exists immediately 
any 
before the fatal blow is struck~ it need not exist for / appreciable 
period of time. In the court's view, the fact that petr was so un-
Petr doesn't state whether he raised in the state courts the con-
stitutional claims he is now pursuing and the issue is not directly dis-
cussed by the CA in its opinion, which is the only opinion appended to 
the petition. The CA did refuse to consider certain contentions that had 
been raised in the petn for habeas corpus because they had not been raisec 
in the state courts, and I take it from that statement that petr's current 
claims were raised in the state courts. App. at 9 n. 3. 
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threatened by Cole that he had sufficient time within which to reload 
his revolver and the fact that she was shot twice constituted some evi-
dence of an intention on his part to shoot her. That a single shot might 
have been fired accidentally might be believable but that a second was 
fired accidentally after Cole already had been struck was "incred:ible." 
warranted 
The court held that the judge was / in finding that petr was not 
so intoxicated as to negate premeditation and pointed to the fact that 
the sheriff did not think petr so drunk that he should not be allowed to 
leave the diner in the possession of a revolver. Also, the court rejectec 
petr's contention that the judge's finding of premeditation was based 
on erroneous inferences from photographs of Cole's partially decomposed 
body taken after it was found by police. There was some evidence to 
support the ultimate finding of premeditation and there was only a 
suggestion that the judge may have been partially misled in his fact-
finding process. 
3. CONTENTIONS: First, assuming that Thompson v. c:ity of Louisj ana 
is still the law, petr argues that the CA 4 erred in finding that there 
was "some" evidence to support the element of premedi·tation. Principally, 
petr argues that his intoxication negated any premeditation. The autopsy 
of cole showed that at the time of her death her blood alcohol level was 
.17%, which is well in excess of that deemed necessary to prove intoxi-
cation. Petr claims that his blood alcohol level was surely at least as 
high as Cole's. He points out that the revolver was an automatic so that 
the number of shots fired cannot prove premeditation. 
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Petr next contends that a habeas court must find more than simply 
"some" evidence to support each element~ rather, it must satisfy itself 
that the trier of fact was warranted in finding each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt. He argues that any holding to the contrary in Thompson 
was overruled, sub sil:~ntio, in In re Tflinship, supra, where the Court 
stated, "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged. 11 He contends that this 
due process protection would be meaningless if only '~orne" evidence were 
considered sufficient. In petr•s view, a court could not conclude that 
the element of premeditation was proved beyond a reasonable doubt in 
~~ this case, unless the court•s finding was based, as petr suggests, on 
improper inferences dra'lm from gruesome photographs of Cole • s body. 
4. DISCUSSION: The only possibly certworthy question is whether 
the CA was correct in applying the rule of Thompson v. City of Louisiana 
in light of In re Winship. If the CA was correct on this issue, the only 
question left is a fact specific, sufficiency of the evidence claim. 
There certainly appears to have been "some" evidence of premeditation, 
as set forth by the CA. 
In Thompson, the Court, reviewing petr•s conviction in state court, 
stated that the "ultimate question presented to us is whether t.he charges 
against petitioner were so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to 
render his conviction unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause 
Decision of this question turns not on the sufficiency of the evidence, 
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but on whether this conviction rests up(;>n any evidence at all." 362 
U.S. at 199: accord, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 u.s. 87, 94 (1965); 
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 u.s. 157, 163 (1961)~ The Court found no evi-
dence to support Thompson's conviction. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364 (1970), the Court held that the "Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 
In his dissent from the denial of cert. in Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 
U.s. 1111, (1977) (75-6898), Justice Stewart suggested that the "no evi-
dence" rule of Thompson should be reevaluated in light of the pd nciples 
announced in In re Winship o He urged that the standard should be whether 
there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding by the 
trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In his view the 
sufficiency of the evidence standard was of const i tutional dimensions 
and habeas courts were bound to apply it. If the Court is inclined to 
reevaluate the standard set forth in Thompson, this case would appear 
to be as good a case as any. Neither petr nor the CA 4 pointed to any 
split in the circuits on this issue, however. 
There is no response. 
10/4/78 
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Motion of Appointment of Counsel 
Carolyn Colville asks for appointment as counsel to represent 
petr before this Court, although she is not yet a member of the bar 
of this Court. She was appointed to represent petr by CA 4, and 
prepared and signed the cert petn. 
Applicant graduated from the T.C. Williams School of Law 
(Richmond, Va., 1976), is admitted in Virginia (1976), by the DC 
(ED va.), and CA 4, and has been engaged in the general practice of 
law since June 1976. 
Miss Colville will seek admission to this Court as soon as she 
lS eligible (in about six months). The Clerk suggests that this case 




r.FP /lab 3/5/79 
r •• F. P. , Jr • 
No. 78-S283 Jackson v. Virginia 
In Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.R. 199 (1960), 
the Court h~ld that on fe~era1 habeas corpus review of a 
state conviction the writ should be denied if there was 
"some 11 evidence to prove each element of the offense. 
In dissenting in 1977 from denial of cert in 
Fn~eman v. Zahradnick, 429 u.s. 1111, ,Justice Stewart arqued 
that in liqht of Winship, 397 u.s. 358 (1970), the rule of 
Thompson should be reexamined with the vi~w to chanqinq 
habeas corpus standard to require evidence 11 beyond all 
reasonable doubt" with respect to each element of the 
offense. We took the present case to consider the question 
raised hv Justice Stewart. 
In this case Jackson was convicted, in 
Chesterfield County, Virginia, of first-deqree murder (not 
capital murder) of a woman when they were on a drinkinq 
spree toqeth~r. The killing occurred in an arqument over 
sex. As there were no witnesses, the evidence was entirely 
circumstantial. In Virginia, Premeditation does not mean 
that the murder was planned • No particular interval of time 
. :;.; 




is necessary. Here, the woman was shot twice in 
circumstances which - as I view the ~vidence - makes 
Jackson's account of an accidental killing quite incredible. 
Thus, I suppose this case could be d~cided on the ground 
that the conviction should be affirmed even on a reasonable 
doubt standard. 
If, however, we reach the issue that promoted us 
to grant, I would like your thinking. As I do not have the 
books here (my apartment}, I have not reread Winship. My 
recollection is that it dealt with the requirements of proof 
at trial rather than upon habeas corpus review. The state's 
brief also says that ~mpson was reaffirmed in Garner v. 
Louisiana, 368 u.s. 157 and Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 
u.s. 87, and has been followed by most of the federal courts 
of appeal. 
A theoretical argument in favor of the reasonable 
doubt standard is appealing. The standard distinguishes our 
leqal system from that of most other countries in the world. 
But it is a standard applicable to trial, and direct review. 
I am not persuaded that the purpose of - or the policy 
underlying - federal habeas corpus review of state 
convictions requires a de novo examination of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to the extent of applying the 
strictest standard of proof. 
There are strong policy reasons of federalism and 
.. 
l 




finality that support Thompson. The possibility of an 
innocent person being convicted of a felony (and whose 
conviction is not set aside either on appeal or upon habeas 
corpus) is infinitely remote under our elaborate system of 
appeals. 
The theoretical argument to the contrary is, 
however, not frivolous. If the state conviction is on less 
evidence t~an the reasonable doubt standard requires, there 
has been a denial of due Process. Thus, the case presents a 
choice between the symmetry of a uniform standard, on the 
one hand, and the history, practicalities and policy 




~141rnnr <!Jour! of fqr :JlniJrl'l ~hurtl 
Jlln.o frnt ~ton. :ID. <!f. :::!.n,sn ~~ 
April 4, 197Y 
PERSONAL 
Re: 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia, et al. 
Dear Harry: 
The vote in this case will effect, as I see it, a 
monumental change in the concept of federal review of 
state criminal cases on collateral attack. 
Lewis is particularly distressed about this case, and 
I suppose that is so partly because of Stone v. Powell, 
for the two cases have a common, underlying theme. This 
is another one of the cases where, coming to us as the 
fifth court dealing with the relatively simple matter, we 
are on the threshold of making a very important change 
which could impose heavy burdens on federal courts. In 
dealing with a collateral attack on a state conviction 
confirmed by the highest court of the state, the federal 
role up to now was to do no more than determine whether 
the fundamental "rules of the club" have been followed by 
the state. 
Of course, there is no question about the burden of 
proof at trial, but the Winship case added nothing to the 
long-established American rule of burden of proof in 
non-civil cases. Every state in the Union has followed 
that standard since the beginning of the Republic. The 
Winship case did no more than say that this universally 
accepted idea was constitutionally based. It will add an 
enormous burden to the District Courts if a collateral 
attack under § 2255, or by way of habeas corpus, requires 
-- or permits -- the District Court to reweigh the 
evidence to decide whether a federal judge would have 
reached the same result. 
·,·, .,, 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:Su:vrtUU Qiourl of tlf.t ~ttiftb, ~tatts 
Jhtsltittgttttt. ~. QI. 2llp~.;l 
Re: No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia 
Dear Chief: 
April 5, 1979 
I am not sure that I understand the import of your letter 
of April 4, for it seems to me to embrace a misapprehension about 
my vote at the Conference. 
When this case was discussed, I said this: 
1. 1 felt that Winship changed the rules or at least raised 
a warning flag with respect to Thompson v. Louisville. The dis-
sents in Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111, surely indicate 
that this view was entertained by three Justices who participated in 
Winship. 
2. I do not accept the California suggestion that the Winship 
clai may not have been raised in the Virginia courts. I also am 
not persuaded by the California argument that Stone v. Powell should 
be extended to foreclose sufficiency of the evidence claims. This, 
for n e, would be too great an expansion of Stone. Further ore, a 
claim as to the sufficiency of the evidence goes to the heart of the 
judicial process and the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. 
3. If the standard of Thompson v. Louisville is to apply, 
this case is a cle r affirm. 
4. For me (but apparently not for others), if Winship im-
posed standards different from Thompson for habeas review, then 
under Winship, too, this case is a clear affirm. The facts are 
devastating. There is no direct evidence of how drunk ackson was. 
The deputy did not take his gun away from hi and thus could not 
have thought he was very drunk. He was sober enough to reload the 
gun under stress. His version of the struggle, in light of the physi· 
cal evidence, is incredible. The victim was shot twice (shades of 
- z -
~ v. New York Life Ins. Co.). He fled all the way to Florida. 
When he returned from Florida, he did not go back to Virginia but 
stayed in North Carolina .. 
5. The easy way to dispose of this case would be to say 
that under either standard an affirmance is in order. 
6. We did not take thh case, however, just to pass judg-
ment on its particular facts (I voted to deny certiorari), but to 
straighten out the Thompson- Winship confusion which has been 
with us now too long. I therefore could face the issue and decide 
it. I do not share your feeling that the Winship approach would 
effect "a monumental change. '1 There would be some state court 
irritation, of course (witness Kentucky v. Wharton), but the bur-
den on the federal courts would not be a great one. They would 
be applying the same standard of review they routinely apply in 
federal cases. 
I say again that the easy way to resolve this particular 
case ie to affirm it under whichever standard applies and let it 
go at that. No one else around the conference table seemed to 
agree; all appeared to take the one extreme view or the other 
extrerr.e view. Just where I shall end up on the final vote depends 
on the writing. The crux, I think, came when Winship was de-
cided in 1970. I was not here then, but I well recall how sur-
prised I was that a case of that kind was decided at so late a date. 
Because your letter indicates that you have discussed this 'k?-
~
i~it, I am sending a copy of this letter to him. If 1?-1!/ 
you wish, I shall circulate something to this general effect to the 
other members of the Court. They may well share the same mis-
apprehension as you do about my vote. I thought at the time of 
the Conference, however, that it was perfectly clear and that 1 
was in the middle between the two "camps. " 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMeERS Of" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
PERSONAL 
..§npunu Clfonrl of tqt~h _inmg 
:J~Jagqmghtn. ~. <!f. 20bi'1-~ 
April 23, 1979 
Dear Harry: 
Re: 78-5283 Jackson v. Virginia 
In your memorandum of April 5, final paragraph, 
you inquired whether you should "circulate something 
to this general effect .... " 
I am inclined to think this might be useful and 
give Lewis a chance to be heard on a case which, as the 
only "true ·blue Virginian" implicates him perhaps 
specially. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
be: Mr. Justice Powell 
Dear Potter: 
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that 








' ·- ¥:'~' ',:: 
-~; '-4-~~-· \ 1' '· ' 
~upunu <!fomi o-f Urt 'J!tniub- ~brltll' 
... M'.fringhm. ~. <!f. 20,?'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
J USTICE JOHN PA U L STEVENS 
May 24, 1979 
Re: 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia 
Dear Potter: 
As I believe I have already indicated, I will 
be dissenting. Because I regard this as an 
exceptionally important case, it may take me a 
little while to organize my thoughts. 
At the moment, I am not entirely clear as 
to whether your "rational trier of the fact" standard 
is to be equated with a sort of rational basis equal 
protection standard which presumably would be satisfied 
by any evidence--in which event the case may be a 
tempest in a teapot--or the new ·standard is one that 
will require federal district judges and Courts of 
Appeals to review the entire transcript of every state 
criminal trial whenever an allegation of insufficient 
evidence is made. I am fearful that the lower courts 
will give your opinion the latter interpretation and 
that the increased burden on the Judiciary that will 
flow from this decision may well do more to encourage 
judicial resignations than the failure to pay judges 
decent wages. 
Of even greater importance, I think your basic 
analysis is flawed. For i f Winship means that every 
finding of guilt must be supported by a quantum of 
proof that satisfies a constitutionally required 
r~a~onable doubt stand~rd, I should think it would 
- 2 -
follow that appellate judges and habea~ judges should 
also be satisfied that guilt has been satisfied beyond 
a reasonable doubt. if you reject this conclusion 
because we must place some faith in the system when the 
trial has been fair in all other respects, I do not 
understand why we cannot continue to trust the system 
we have been using up to now. Surely your citation of 
Clyatt (which applied the any evidence standard), and 
Glasser and Bronston, (neither of which involved a reversal 
for 1nsufficiency of evidence) on page 8 of your opinion 
do not demonstrate any need to develop a new standard of 
review. 
In any event, as these hastily dictated comments 
indicate, I do feel very strongly about this case and 
I hope you will bear with me if I take more time .than 
is sometimes appropriate for dissenters. 
Respectfully, 
jL 
Mr. Justice Stewart 




JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:p:rmtt <!fontiof tlrt~b ~fattg 
Jfag fringLnt. ~. QJ. 2Il~Jt. ~ 
May 25, 1979 
Re: No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia 
Dear John, 
I had understood that you would be dissenting in this 
case, and I await your dissenting opinion with interest. 
Please feel under no time pressure whatever. 
At the moment, let me simply say that it seems to me 
that your concern respecting the impact of this decision, 
so picturesquely expressed in your letter, is extravagantly 
unrealistic. This is not a "new standard," but one which 
trial judges have routinely had to apply in dealing with 
motions for acquittal and one that appellate judges have 
routinely applied in dealing with claims of insufficiency 
of the evidence. See,~·~·, Judge Prettyman's opinion in 
Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232. In an adversary 
system, where the applicant for habeas corpus has the burden 
of proof, I doubt there would be any measurable increase 
in the burden upon federal district judges. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
' .. . ~ ' ,. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
,§uprmtt ~ttmt of tqt 'Jttnitd! :§tatts 
~ lt9 Jrhtghttt. :!0. <!I. 2ll gt~ ,;l 
May 29, 1979 
Re: 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia, et al. 
Dear Potter, 
I shall, of course, be interested in 
what John writes but for now and likely for 
the long pull, I agree. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice stewart 




j5u:pumt <!Jtturlttf ffrt %tiltb j5ta.U.t¥ 
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CHAMBE RS OF 
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Mr. Justice Stewart 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~ttprtntt Qfcttrl of tlrt ~t~ ~taftg 
jiufrhtg~ Ifl. <!}. 2ll~~~ 
June 6, 1979 
v 
Re: No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia 
Dear John: 
Please join me in your dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
·. 
CHAMIII!:AS 01'" 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
Re: 
~ttprnnt <lfDUri of tltt ~~ ~t 
Jlaslfittghtn. ~. a}. 20?"~ 
June 12, 1979 
78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia 
Dear John: 
I join your dissenting opinion. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 








.§ttpTttttt <!fJ!Urlnf fltt%tfu~ .§tzdtg 
~ MlpttgLm. ~. Q}. 2ll~J.!-~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART June 20, 1979 
Re: No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. ~inia 
Dear Harry: 
Thank you for your letter of today. I 
agree with you that a rational trier of fact could 
have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of first degree murder under Virginia law• 
Accordingly, I shall recast part IV to enable you 
to join the opinion, trusting that those who have 
already joined it will also go along. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
v 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§uvrtttU Qfonrl ttf tqt 'Jlinitt~ ..§ni£rg 
.. ufli:ttgltm. ~. Qf. 2ll~~.;l 




I have read and reread your and John's successive 
writings on the two sides of this case, and I write now to 
set forth where I come out. 
I originally voted to deny certiorari in this case. I 
did so because I felt that on the lurid facts this was not 
a very good case to rationalize and resolve the respective 
foundations of Thompson v. Louisville and In re Winship. 
Despite the fact that there have been no new or clarifying 
developments since certiorari was granted, I could easily 
vote to DIG this case. 
You and John, however, have invested time and hard 
work, and that time and hard work are not easily set aside. 
The facts are devastating. Petitioner's story isba-
sically incredible. There is no direct evidence of how 
drunk he really was. He was not drunk enough for the 
deputy to have taken his gun away. He was sober enough to 
reload the weapon under stress. He shot his victim twice 
(this brings to mind the parallel two-shot fact situation 
in Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 u.s. 437 (1959), 
and-my-vivid recollection of the Eighth Circuit's unani-
mous outrage at its reversal in that case.) Petitioner 
left his victim in the parking lot without seeking assis-
tance. He fled to Florida. When he left Florida he re-
turned only to North Carolina and not to Virginia. He 
attempted to sell th~ victim's car. 
It therefore seems to me that under any standard what-
soever, whether that of Thompson or that of Winship, a 
rational trier of fact could have found petitioner guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Thus, it seems to me that the proposed disposition of 
the case is an e~ercise in legal theory that does not have 
much critical bearing on this particular petitioner. In 
Part IV of your opinion you conclude that the application 
of the correct criterion to the evidence is appropriately 
left to the Cou(t of Appeals. This normally is the kind 
of disposition n6 one can properly criticize. But, for 
me, on the facts of this case .it seems to be rather futile. 
We did otherwise in Fare v. Michael c., decided only today. 
I indicated at Conference that so far as the analysis 
between Thompson on the one hand and Winship on the other 
is concerned, my sympathies are with your side of the argu-
ment and, in a "proper" case I believe I would so vote. 
The bottom line in this case for me, however, is to affirm. 
I could, of course, write something to the effect that 
I agree with your analysis, or even formally join Parts I, 
II, and III of your opinion, but refrain from joining Part 
IV and cast my vote to affirm the judgment of the Fourth 
Circuit. This is not a very satisfactory solution from an 
institutional point of view. Other alternatives are to 
regard the case as affirmed by a equally divided vote (and 
wait for a better case which is sure to come), or to let 
the case go over the Term for reargument when Lewis will be 
able to participate. This obviously is something ~o be 
discussed tomorrow. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
,ju:pum.t Q}tru:rl trf tlft ~ttitt~ ,jW:ts 
Jragfringhm. ~. Q}. 21lgiJI.J 
Re: No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia 
Dear Potter, 
As before, I am still with you. 
Sincerely yours, 
Av~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
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